Military Learning Center » the Persian Gulf

AFCent commander: Short tours best

Angel — Sun, 27 Dec 2009 13:41:07 +0000

The commander overseeing the Air Force’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan favors short tours in the war zones, despite a call by the Pentagon for yearlong deployments for instructors, and envisions airmen someday being stationed in the Persian Gulf with their families if host nations agree.Lt. Gen. Mike Hostage touched on the length of deployments and the Air Force’s long-term role in the Middle East during an exclusive telephone interview with Air Force Times from his office in the Persian Gulf.Hostage took over Air Forces Central Command, the air component of U.S. Central Command, in August. At the same time, the Air Force temporarily separated AFCent and the Ninth Air Force, both with headquarters at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., to allow the AFCent commander to focus on war fighting.On Afghanistan, Hostage is waiting for word from Central Command on how many airmen will be part of the 30,000-troop buildup ordered by President Barack Obama and what roles they will play.The Air Force could assign airmen to missions in Afghanistan but base them outside the country, he said. For example, C-17 Globemasters and KC-135 Stratotankers assigned to Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan already fly Afghan assignments. Long-range B-1B Lancer bombers, KC-10 Extender tankers and C-17s reach Afghanistan from Persian Gulf airfields.Much of the focus is on close air support operations, a mission for which the Air Force and other services have taken criticism when the attacks kill civilians.Hostage, who flew F-16s for much of his career, backed his aircrews.“My aviators are disciplined professionals,” he said.Close-air support strikes always come at the request of ground commanders, who make hard choices, Hostage pointed out.“If he chooses an air strike,” he said, “we’re going to hit it.”During the summer, some Defense Department officials raised concerns about B-1B Lancer bombers flying close-air support. After a review, the Pentagon decided to keep the bombers on the mission because they can remain over a target for a long time and drop guided bombs with the same accuracy as fighters.“There is no finer platform,” Hostage said.For Iraq, Hostage expects airmen to stay put right up until the withdrawal deadlines — August 2010 for 80,000 troops and the end of 2011 for the remaining 50,000 service members.“The Air Force will maintain a constant level until late in the game,” he said.Even as soldiers head out, airmen will fly combat and reconnaissance air patrols, manage airfields and installations, fly troops and cargo and train the Iraqi air force. Still, Hostage’s orders are to have all airmen — even instructors — out of the country by the 2011 deadline mandated by an agreement between the Iraqi and U.S. governments.Defense Secretary Robert Gates believes Air Force trainers could stay in Iraq beyond 2011.“I wouldn’t be a bit surprised to see agreements between ourselves and the Iraqis that continue a train, equip and advise role beyond the end of 2011,” Gates told troops at Kirkuk Air Base in Iraq in early December.Air Force instructors have taught Iraqis to fly and repair C-130 Hercules, helicopters and a host of small propeller-driven aircraft. Now, the Iraqi government is moving to buy fighter jets such as F-16 Fighting Falcons.Whatever aircraft the Iraqi government chooses to fly, Air Force instructors can prepare Iraqi service members.“They will get to decide [the aircraft],” Hostage said. “Our job will be to train them up.”Hostage would not discuss specifics on how the Air Force could continue to train Iraqi airmen past 2011 if the Iraqi air force moves to jet fighters but expects the relationship to continue. It takes the U.S. Air Force about two years to train its own new fighter pilots.“We’ll be in the Gulf with our friends and allies for a long time,” Hostage said.Before taking command of AFCent, Hostage spent 18 months as vice commander of Pacific Air Forces.An earlier assignment to AFCent came in July 2001 when he arrived to lead for one year the 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the primary base for Southern Watch patrols over Iraq.Two months into Hostage’s command, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks changed everything as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan began.“We went from 3,800 airmen to 11,000. Life got very busy,” Hostage said.AFCent’s pace has not slowed, with about 28,000 airmen, most on four- to six-month deployments, assigned to the command.For the near future, Hostage favors continuing to deploy airmen for short tours because they are manageable for the deploying airmen and the base that has to make do without the airmen.In the long term, Hostage can see airmen on accompanied tours in the Middle East — much as they are in Germany and Japan — when the combat tempo slows and the risk decreases, and if host nations do not object.

Vice adm. nominated to head NorthCom

Angel — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 21:50:27 +0000

Vice Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr. was nominated Wednesday for a fourth star and appointment as commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.If confirmed, Winnefeld will become the fourth commander and second admiral to head the Defense Department’s response in homeland security mattersNorthern Command was established Oct. 1, 2002, to oversee homeland defense efforts and coordinate defense support of civil authorities. Its area of responsibility encompasses the continental U.S., as well as Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to about 500 nautical miles.The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president or secretary of defense.Winnefeld is the director of strategic plans and policy, J-5, and is the senior member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, Pentagon, Washington.An aerospace engineering graduate from the Georgia Institute of Technology, Winnefeld is a naval aviator who served with two fighter squadrons and as an instructor at the Navy Fighter Weapons School known as Top Gun.He has commanded Fighter Squadron 211, the amphibious transport dock ship Cleveland and the carrier Enterprise. He led “Big E” through combat operations in Afghanistan immediately after the terrorist acts of Sept. 11, 2001. As commander, Carrier Strike Group 2/Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, he led Task Forces 50, 152 and 58 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and headed maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf. He also served as commander, 6th Fleet and senior aide to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

Crews say minesweepers in disrepair

Angel — Sun, 06 Dec 2009 13:55:48 +0000

Last spring, two minesweepers began an “extended deployment” to the Western Pacific with the promise of exotic Asian port visits, but instead of adventure, the ships got delays, confusion and lots of requests for spare parts.Now, the mine countermeasures ships Avenger and Defender are stuck in bureaucratic limbo, their sailors told Navy Times, because Navy, U.S. and Japanese officials haven’t decided where the ships will be permanently based. They’re both in Sasebo, Japan, but some of the crews’ families are in Ingleside, Texas — site of their former home port — while others are scattered across the country, waiting to learn where the ships will finally end up.The ships, their crews and families have waited months without a decision, and in the meantime, the sailors haven’t been home to the U.S. or seen their loved ones. They’ve been given no end date for their deployment, and their ships are falling apart while they wait. The situation is unsatisfactory, one sailor told Navy Times.“I have done deployments before, so my family and I were prepared for a deployment, but not being able to tell my wife where she will be living, or the fact that I may be moving to Japan and she cannot come, is unsat,” he said.The sailors who spoke with Navy Times asked not to be identified because they feared command repercussions for discussing the ships’ plight.Since the Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended closing Ingleside, the longtime home of mine warfare, fleet officials have eliminated the Osprey-class coastal minesweepers and moved Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command to Naval Base San Diego. As part of the closure, the remaining Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships had to get out of Texas. Although the others went to San Diego, Avenger and Defender were sent directly to Japan.Piece by pieceWithin a month after the Avenger arrived, it had to loan its anchor windlass to one of the permanently forward-deployed minesweepers in Sasebo so the other ship could pass an inspection from the Board of Inspection and Survey. It gave up parts from its sonar system to another ship so the other crew could join a fleet exercise. Wear and tear began to take their toll, especially in the Avenger’s machinery spaces, where sailors have struggled to keep its main engines going, a second sailor said.The Defender has had a better time since the move to Japan, and it has spent more time than its sibling at sea, taking part in exercises with other U.S. and South Korean warships. Still, the crews of both ships have grown weary.“From what I’ve heard, everybody on board, from the top level all the way to the bottom, is really frustrated,” said Marla Perez, the Avenger’s ombudsman.Their situation is made even more acute because the sailors aboard both minesweepers are the same ones who deployed with them, and they have not been given the chance to rotate off the ships, as is typical with MCMs. The Navy maintains multiple crews for each minesweeper hull, which enables it to keep the same ships in the Persian Gulf, for example, but to alternate crews regularly. Not so for Avenger and Defender, the first sailor said.“As far as the crews, we are it. They took us out of rotation and put us on these hulls and said, ‘You are now a permanent crew, and you will be moving to Japan eventually.’ This situation I am not complaining about; I do not mind Japan or even being on a deployment, but we are not getting any information about when our families will come or if they even can.”That’s another sticky aspect to this situation. When the Avenger and Defender were moved from Ingleside, neither their crews nor their families were clear on where they should relocate. Some moved to San Diego, some stayed in Ingleside, and many moved in with other family members in their homes around the U.S. Perez estimated most of the ships’ families had scattered.When the Navy eventually chooses a home port, it isn’t clear whether the service will pay to relocate those families again, the first sailor said, or at least whether it would move them to Sasebo.Lt. Matt Galan, a spokesman for Pacific Fleet, said he had no information about the Avenger’s and Defender’s home-port situation, or whether the crews’ families would be relocated if the ships stay in Japan. Other Navy spokesmen, with 7th Fleet and at the Pentagon, also said they had no information.That’s just what the minesweeper crews and their families have gotten used to hearing.“The answers remain the same,” the second sailor said: “‘As soon as we hear something, we’ll let you know.’”

Report: Lax leadership led to Hormuz collision

Angel — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 13:41:25 +0000

The navigator was listening to his iPod during a critical evolution.Watchstanders were known to sleep on the job.Stereo speakers were rigged for music in the radio room.An informal atmosphere — along with crew complacency, a “weak” command and inferior submariner skills — are named as contributors to the March 20 collision between the attack submarine Hartford and the amphibious transport dock New Orleans in the Strait of Hormuz.And according to a heavily redacted 102-page Judge Advocate General Manual investigation obtained by Navy Times through a Freedom of Information Act request, what turned into a major embarrassment for the submarine fleet was entirely “avoidable.”The collision happened just after midnight in calm seas as Hartford was at periscope depth and southbound, crossing the strait bound for a port call in Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates.New Orleans — 70 days into its first deployment — was westbound, exiting the surface transit lane of the strait. The state-of-the-art gator was entering the Persian Gulf as part of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group.The ships crashed as they intersected. Fifteen sailors on Hartford were hurt, none more seriously than during a typical swim call, according to the boat’s corpsman. No one on New Orleans was injured.The crew of New Orleans “bears no fault” for the accident, the report said.When it was all over, Hartford would take one month to limp home to Groton, Conn., on the surface, its captain and chief of the boat both fired. Today, Hartford is still undergoing extensive repairs to its bent sail, internal components and damaged bow planes at General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton. Industry experts estimate the bill to be more than $100 million.New Orleans suffered a 16-by-18-foot gash in its hull. It would spend 53 days in Bahrain undergoing $2.3 million in repairs while stranding embarked leathernecks from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit.Problems at the topBlame for the whole debacle lands squarely with a command team on Hartford that tolerated an “informal” atmosphere on the ship, the report said.Cmdr. Ryan Brookhart was detached for cause and chief of the boat Master Chief Electronics Technician (SS) Stefan Prevot was reassigned to Submarine Squadron 4 in the aftermath. The navigator, executive officer and weapons officer underwent nonjudicial punishment, as did 10 sailors. Also, administrative action was taken against three direct support element members assigned to Naval Information Operations Command in Georgia as well as a fleet intelligence specialist based near Washington, D.C. The report did not explain what role they played.The report’s final endorsement, by Fleet Forces Command head Adm. John Harvey, called the accident the result of “nearly 30 tactical and watchstander errors” in the hour before the collision. He also noted that the command failed to hold subordinates accountable, “and a high price has been paid for that shortcoming.”Harvey also directed the submarine force to review all collisions back to the attack sub Greeneville’s fatal crash into a Japanese fisheries training boat in 2001 near Hawaii.Vice Adm. Jay Donnelly, Submarine Force commander, spoke candidly about the mishap Oct. 28 during the annual Naval Submarine League meeting in McLean, Va.He said the crew had just finished an intense operational phase of its deployment and “everybody let down their guard” for what was actually one of the most challenging phases, crossing the strait at periscope depth.He also noted that more or better technology would not have helped the situation, as the sub crew knew New Orleans and another ship were nearby.A bigger issueThe collision illustrates the force’s larger problem with contact management. An internal message sent by Submarine Force Pacific commander Rear Adm. Douglas McAneny less than a month after the collision urged commanders and commodores to boost crews’ ability to track surface contacts.“Over several months” prior to the incident, hundreds of watchstanders were tested in their ability to understand how to analyze the movement of surface contacts. The exams yielded results of 10 percent to 15 percent passing grades among enlisted watchstanders and 60 percent of officers.“Given the attention I have personally placed on submerged contact management in briefing the waterfronts, this is unacceptable,” McAneny wrote in the message obtained by Navy Times.Not up to standardAt the time of the collision, the sub was southbound at periscope depth, periodically raising and lowering its periscope.When the ships collided, the New Orleans crew felt “a shudder and rumbling.” That bridge team slowed to 3 knots and launched a small boat to look for damage. The big amphib had flooding in ballast and fuel tanks and listed “1.5 degrees to starboard.”On Hartford, the crash caused the door of the control room to be jammed shut by a battle lantern, a fuel leak in the machinery room, and “light smoke” in that space and in the torpedo room.The bow planes were not working and the periscopes would not rise. The towed array was retrieved and baffles cleared before conducting an emergency blow and surfacing 3,000 yards from New Orleans. It took the crew nearly four hours using “wedges and a portable hydraulic jack” to pry open hatches up to the bridge.Blame is on Brookhart for failing to plan the “strait transit and crossing evolution,” for failing to communicate the plan, and leaving watchstanders without “the heightened risk that should have been foremost on everyone’s mind.”But the watchstanders were not up to standard to begin with, according to the report.Control room understanding of contact management was found to be poor enough that crewmembers “routinely failed to critically evaluate the validity” of computer-generated contact information with “raw sensor data.”But as McAneny urged commanders to get their crews up to standard, the causes of the collision point to leadership. Brookhart, the executive officer and COB were together tagged with setting a command climate that lacked a “questioning attitude” that is expected in the submarine force and for fostering a “general level of complacency.”It was felt by even the youngest sailors. Helmsmen — always the newest crew — told investigators they often would “slouch in their seats with one hand on the controls,” and would “take off their shoes while driving the ship.”Sailors also reported a lax attitude in the sonar division about taking breaks.On the night of the crash, sonar operators chatted “for the majority of the time [in the hour before] the collision.” An officer of the deck did not look through the periscope prior to the collision after taking over contact management duties.The navigator, off-watch, was found to have been taking an engineering exam in the wardroom “while listening to his iPod,” despite the hazardous evolution underway.Brookhart was never in the control room during any time crossing the strait, the investigators found.Prior to the accident, speakers had been installed in the ultra-sensitive radio room “that allowed music to be played from an iPod while on watch. This was hidden from the Chain of Command.”Perhaps most shocking was this revelation: “Many crewmembers stated there were numerous ‘known’ sleepers [five specific names were reiterated by the majority of those crewmembers interviewed]. Those personnel would routinely fall asleep [‘nod off’] on watch, and no disciplinary action was taken.”Two of the known sleepers were on watch during the collision, the report states.The investigating team does make a point at the end of the report to say most of the sailors on the ship were of an “absolutely superb caliber” now “hungering for effective leadership” and “eager to restore their ship’s standing.”Related reading• Hormuz collision has sub, amphib out of action• Navy inspects damaged ships after collision• Chief of Hartford sacked after collision

U.S. admiral takes over piracy task force

Angel — Tue, 18 Aug 2009 21:15:51 +0000

ABOARD THE CRUISER ANZIO IN THE NORTH ARABIAN SEA — The cruiser Anzio, now with a U.S. admiral aboard leading a multinational counter-piracy task force, has left the Persian Gulf and is preparing for stepped-up pirate attacks the Horn of Africa region as weather conditions improve.Last Thursday, Rear Adm. Scott Sanders took command of Task Force 151 from Rear Adm. Caner Bener, of the Turkish navy, who had been leading 5th Fleet’s counter-piracy campaign from the Norfolk, Va.-based Anzio.Sanders inherits a mixed staff of U.S. and British officers. A four-man Coast Guard law enforcement detachment is aboard to work alongside Anzio’s three boarding teams, and a small surgical team is also embarked.Vice Adm. Bill Gortney, 5th Fleet commander, has reiterated that piracy may center on hijacking ships for ransoms, but it’s a problem that cannot be solved by navies.“We’re not going to be successful because we are working at the prevention effort at sea. And not enough is being done at the root cause,” he said during an Aug. 16 interview with Navy Times in Bahrain. “No one is trying to cure the cancer. We’re dealing with the symptoms.”As Task Force 151 commander, Sanders leads one of several multinational forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali Basin. Officers from 23 nations including Russia, China and India met recently in Bahrain to discuss the effort.Pirate activity usually picks up here at this time of year, as rough seas in the region give way to more permissive conditions at sea.“The numbers are way down for the last couple months but that’s because Mother Nature is on our side, the southwest monsoon,” Gortney said. “[Pirates] are starting to come out. They took one of the pirated vessels, WinFar and took it way out because they’re using it as a mother ship. And 880 miles is [our] closest ship.”Anzio left Norfolk on May 13.DISCUSS: The task force